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The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Liberal Democratic or Authoritarian Regime?
Solomon Terfa,
Mississippi Valley State University
Abstract: The leaders of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia adopted their constitution on
December 8, 1994. This analysis argues that the ethno-linguistic federal political system adopted by
the founding members is problematic because the framers superimposed the constitution on the
citizens dogmatically without thoroughly examining the country’s objective reality. Hence, the
author contends that the ethnic federalist paradigm adopted in Ethiopia is diametrically opposed to
the wishes and aspirations of the people as validated by a survey he conducted between 1992 and
1993. He draws from this, perhaps the first and only study on this pertinent topic, to argue his case.
The author also argues that the framers excluded the citizens from being represented at the
constitution drafting convention by bona fide experts because they knew the people would neither be
amenable to nor supportive of the political agenda the framers had designed. This reinforces the
mutual mistrust between the citizens and the government. Inevitably, authoritarian rule was
established.
Keywords: Authoritarianism, ethno-linguistic federalism, Ethiopian people‘s revolutionary
democratic front, Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist, the national question, Tigrean people‘s liberation front

Introduction

Ethiopia‘s political history has undergone centuries of authoritarian rule, much of

it marked by
feudalism—embedded in the country‘s centuries-old monarchy—that was brought to end in 1974 by
a ―Marxist‖ military dictatorship. The later lasted until 1991, when it was toppled by the current
rulers of the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The Tigrean People‘s
Liberation Front (TPLF), the dominant faction of the EPRDF representing the de facto ruling elites
in Ethiopia today under an ethnically-based federal system, has since instituted a controversial nation
building effort that stifled the democratic aspirations of the Ethiopian people; hence the focus of this
study.
Given the above backdrop, this study will show the constitutional framework of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which the TPLF superimposed on the country in December 1994,
was an attempt to rule under the guise of democracy, while fulfilling the goal of perpetuating a
minority control of Ethiopia‘s political and economic powerbase. Thus a case can be made that the
ethno-linguistic federalist system adopted by the TPLF is not predicated on any empirical study or
evidence. Rather, it is the dialectical offshoot of the longstanding Ethiopian students‘ infatuation
with the ―Land to the Tiller‖ and the ―National Question‖ political slogan popular during the 1960s
and 1970s when radical revolutionary ideas began to appear inconsequentially in the Ethiopian
student movement. The theoretical and ideological underpinning of this call was Marxism-Leninism,
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in which the conceptual roots of both slogans are found and the revered works of both Lenin and
Stalin are accentuated. The TPLF leaders knew the whole time that most revolutionary and
ideologically-oriented Ethiopians, particularly the educated ones, favored the Marxist-Leninist
framework to solve the ―national/ethnic question‖ in Ethiopia, a political issue that had bedeviled the
Horn of African country and dominated the debate within the Ethiopian students‘ movement during
the imperial rule of the late Emperor Haile Selassie.
This paper analyzes the motivation of the EPRDF for excluding those who were suspicious
and mistrustful of its ultimate objective from the constitution drafting convention. The convention
was a gathering of, on balance, ethnically based organizations that shared the TPLF/EPRDF‘s
objective for establishing an ethno-linguistic federalism. In other words, majority of the Ethiopian
people who would have opposed and resisted the establishment of an ethno-linguistic federalism
were kept out or not represented by bona fide representatives.
This analysis has five parts: (a) the mutual mistrust engendered between the drafters of the
Constitution and the people; (b) the questionable premise upon which the ethno-linguistic federalism
paradigm was founded; (c) whether the constitution is a hybrid of Marxism-Leninism and liberal
democracy; (d) the domination of the country by a single ethnic-based party; and (e) the extent of
authoritarianism in Ethiopia under the TPLF/EPRDF rule.
Why and When the Mutual Suspicion and Mistrust Began?
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was conceived and born in suspicion and
mistrust held mutually between the founders of the FDRE and the people. This came to light when
the TPLF was established as an exclusively Tigrean political party with the intention of liberating the
province of Tigray and then seceding from Ethiopia. While waging its war against the then military
junta, TPLF‘s publications, leaflets, and radio broadcasts had depicted or portrayed it as Marxist
party of the Albanian type. In addition, upon its takeover of Addis Ababa in 1991, the actions and
measures it took and some pronouncements its leaders made seem to have solidified the people‘s
suspicions. Among others are:
 the desecration of the national flag, the symbol and pride of Ethiopia‘s independence, by its
trigger-happy soldiers;
 the massacre of protestors who took to the streets to express not only their opposition to the
desecration but also their love for and loyalty to the flag;
 the trashing of Ethiopian Air Line (EAL), regarded as national pride in African aviation;
 Meles‘s sarcastic challenge made to his political opponents ―mengedun cherq yaragilatchu”
(a bon voyage equivalent to those who were considering the military route) during his
nationally televised discussion with three prominent intellectuals, Professors Mesfin Wolde
Mariam, Andreas Eshete, and Makkonen Bishaw;
 the caricaturing of the Addis Ababa University as a bastion of chauvinist and petty-bourgeois
reactionaries that was willing to send its students to the war front;
132
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the continued echoing of the Eritrean People‘s Liberation Fronts‘ claim that ―Eritrea was a
colony of Ethiopia‖ by Meles and the TPLF leadership and the enthusiastic support they
gave not only to the ―Eritreans-only-referendum‖ but also the invitation they extended to the
OAU and the UN to observe the process and give credence and legitimacy to the outcome of
the whole exercise;
 the expulsion of 42 professors and 18 medical doctors from the Addis Ababa University
and the Army hospital, respectively.
Given this backdrop, it can be reasonably argued that the massacre that took place during the ill
fated national Election of 2005 was a desperate reaction to power slipping out of the hands of the
regime. It could also be surmised as a manifestation of the bottled up resentment to the suspicion the
people had harbored. This author, therefore, contends that it is this mistrust and suspicion that
constrained the government from inviting the people to be represented by genuine and bona fide
peoples‘ representative to participate in the deliberation and ratification of the Constitution it
authored when the Constituent Assembly met in 1994. As indicated in the African Elections
Database, Elections in Ethiopia (2002) which was also corroborated by the government‘s 1995-2005
statistics, of the 547 representatives, 484 belonged to the Ethiopian Revolutionary Democratic Forces
(EPRDF). Edmond J. Keller sarcastically remarked:
Elections for a constituent assembly to approve a new democratic constitution took place in
1994. All registered political parties could participate and, indeed, 39 did participate.
However, the outcome could have been predicted. Member organizations of the EPRDF won
484 of 547 seats. The EPRDF had the advantage of incumbency and a wealth of resources at
its disposal, including patronage with which it could co-opt opposition leaders (Keller 2002,
30).
This action by the government might have, perhaps, reinforced the people‘s doubt about its
motives, sincerity, and vision. Why in the world would a government that purports to establish a
federal, democratic and representative form of government exclude the people from participation?
Should not the people be allowed to have an input in what the government should look like before
they agree to its establishment and become bounded by a constitutional document? Why should a
government that declares that ―sovereignty resides in the nation, nationality, and peoples of Ethiopia‖
(Article 8, section 1 of the Constitution) prevent the supposed owners and beneficiaries of thewould-be government from participating in its conception and birth, so to speak? Were the authors of
the constitution afraid that they would encounter difficulty in convincing the people that they, the
people, are not Ethiopians first but rather Amharas, Oromos, Tigreans, Gurages first and Ethiopians
second?
If this supposition were to be true and if that was what the founding members of the FDRE
were afraid of, then it might be logical to assume that it would also be difficult to convince the
people of the need to include Article 39 of the Constitution, which guarantees every nation,
nationality, or people in the country ―the unrestricted right to self determination up to secession.‖
Assuming that this supposition is true and that secession is what the authors of the constitution had
wanted, then it would also be logical to assume that the people would have had difficulty in
conceding to Article 46, section 2 of the constitution that delineates the boundaries of the states
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taking language as the main criterion.
The Questionable Premise
The ―self-determination including secession‖ premise upon which the Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia is founded is fallacious. It is modeled on Lenin‘s and Stalin‘s work on how to resolve the
national question of Czarist Russia. The Ethiopian Marxist Leninists (EMLs here after) never took
time to ask a very pertinent question. That is, if Lenin and Stalin were genuinely interested in
resolving the national question of Russia, why had they not live up to their promise and allow the
various oppressed nationalities in Czarist Russia to self-determine and secede instead of establishing
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and force them to be part of ? It is the contention of many that
the lives of the various nationalities under Stalin had continued to be as hellish as they had ever been
under Czarist Russia (Kowalski 2008).
It has been pointed out that the constructive policies adopted by Lenin towards the various
nationalities in 1920s, allowing them to develop their own cultures, religions, and languages, were
reversed by Stalin. These policies toward the nationalities were reversed in the 1930s when Stalin
achieved dictatorial control of the Soviet Union. Stalin‘s watchwords regarding nationalities were
centralism and conformity. Although Georgian, Stalin pursued a policy of drawing other nationalities
closer to the Russian nationality. He looked toward Russian culture and language as the links that
would bind different nations together, creating in the process a single Soviet people who would not
only speak Russian but also for all intents and purposes be Russian. Native communist elites were
purged and replaced with Russians or thoroughly Russified persons. Teaching the Russian language
in all schools became mandatory… self-governing powers of the republics were curtailed.
Nationalities were brutally suppressed by such means as the forced famine of 1932-33 in the
Ukrainian Republic and the northern Caucasus and the wholesale deportations of nationalities during
World War II, against their constitutional rights (Zickel 1989, 1-2).
This part needed a long quotation because the EMLs were oblivious to this dark history of the
various nationalities under the person ―who promised them heaven and gave them hell.‖ It appears
that the finding of the Leninist-Stalinist ―method of solving the nationalities problem‖ a la ―selfdetermination including secession‖ was, to the EMLs, their ―eureka moment.‖ They hoped and
believed that this would be the ―silver bullet‖ that would relieve Ethiopia of its long standing
problem. Another problem that was overlooked by the EMLs was that by championing the
nationalities questions, the Bolsheviks would not only hasten the demise of the regime of the Czar
but also ingratiate themselves with the various nationalities. And it had worked. Again the
ramification of this tactic was not given serious thought by the EMLs.
Among the core of Ethiopian Marxist-Leninists (EMLs), Wallelign was one of them. He was
not only the first to define what a nation is, in the Ethiopian context, but also the first to articulate
and categorically state that Ethiopia is composed of many nationalities. He asserted that Ethiopia is,
contrary to traditional belief, composed of many national groupings with their own peculiarities and
idiosyncrasies. He contended that these nations should be given not only the right to participate in
state affairs, but also the right to develop their language, music, and history and secede if they so
134
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desire, provided they are led by peasants and workers who are conscious of their historic
internationalist obligations. It was his firm belief that socialist movements will, in the long run,
remain faithful to their internationalism and unite with other nations of the same conviction led by
their peasants and workers (Van der Beken 1996, 5).
However, the pertinent question to ask is the motivation behind Wallelign‘s radical
pronouncement and call for the destruction of Ethiopia as we know it. It is based on the conviction, I
dare to opine, that the nations, as he likes to refer to them, were oppressed and exploited by the
ruling nation and that their redemption could only be obtained by turning Ethiopia into a socialist
society that will respect and protect their rights. Following Wallelign‘s daring contention, many
scholars, Marxist Leninists and otherwise, began not only to echo and amplify his call but also to
use it as a paradigm in their study of Ethiopian politics. This became the norm both in the 1960s‘
student movement and in the works and speeches of several Ethiopian political observers (Van der
Beken 1996; Gudina 2002; Habtu 2003 and Hameso 2001).
Chris Van der Beken holds Emperor Menelik, a Shoan Amhara and an Orthodox Christian,
who assumed the throne in 1989, responsible for expanding the Abyssinian/Ethiopian heartland to
the South, East, and West. The conquered people not only lost their land and political power, but also
their culture, language, religion, traditions, history, and way of life. It goes without saying therefore
that the unequivocal assimilation of the conquered people in terms of their culture, religion, and
language into the Amhara culture became the required path to develop career within the state. Van
der Beken also suggests that the independence struggle that began in Eritrea in 1960s and the
rebellion in the south-eastern province of Bale where Somali and nascent Oromo nationalism were
observed were all the result of dissatisfaction with Amhara domination (Van der Beken 1996, 2-3).
The EMLs used the above argument as justification for advocating Lenin‘s and Stalin‘s
method of resolving the nationalities question. However, the dysfunctional nature of the institutions
of the imperial government and their failure to attend to people‘s needs and the revolt of the people
against these anachronistic and ill equipped institutions had been misconstrued by the EMLs as
having to do with the national question. The principle of intellectual courage would have demanded
from these EMLs and their foreign intellectual and/or ideological collaborators to offer a realistic
assessment of Ethiopian conditions devoid of Marxist-Leninist dogmas. For instance, they labeled
the Bale and Ethiopian Somales‘ uprisings during the 1960s as nascent nationalism when it was
simply an opposition to taxation. The late Harold Marcus, perhaps one of the most respected
American historians on Ethiopia, narrates the uprising as follows:
The government also used force in Bale and Sidamo between 1963 and 1970 to put down
arebellion among Oromo farmers and Somali herders. Their struggle against new land and
animal taxes inevitably became involved with the politics of Greater Somalia, a circumstance
that caused the government in late 1966 to order the army to intervene. By then, the rebels
controlled southern Bale and southeastern Sidamo and were attacking northern districts at
will, though the Somalis and Oromo were disunited and did not even attempt coordination.
Broadcasting to both groups, Radio Mogadishu stressed the need for Muslim unity against
the Amhara, including the Oromo in the framework of Somali nationalism. The Oromo
remained unconvinced, and in early 1967 the army, now two brigades strong, had little
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difficulty in pacifying the rebellion in Sidamo….By early 1970, the rebellion sputtered out,
and the emperor visited the region to inform the people that their taxes would henceforth be
invested in development projects.
….The Eritrean and Bale challenges revealed that the Ethiopian government had not
undertaken social and economic programs sufficient to win the allegiance of the people.
There were no political parties that could generate competing agenda for action, and
parliament remained very much under the control of landlords. It was impossible for the
institution seriously to consider bills that reformed land tenure, controlled rents, or levied
taxes on the rich. By default, therefore, force became the only tool of social control, partly
because the emperor had grown reliant on the military but also because his government was
inherently weak (Marcus 1994 178-179).
It is obvious that most of the countries in the world are multinational. They are composed of different
peoples with different languages, cultures, values, histories etc. The paramount and very pertinent
question in this connection is how did these multinational countries come into being? This question
goes to the essence of the debate here. What is clear is that no supernatural being had any say or a
hand in the creation of the United States of America, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Nigeria, India, the
former Soviet Union, Switzerland, et cetera. These countries are the result of the dialectical
development of human progress. Wars of expansion and annexation, colonialism and imperialism are
all part and parcel of this dialectical development of human progress. Most of the European countries
with their clearly defined boundaries are product of the Thirty Years War and the Treaty of
Westphalia (1618-1648). The countries of Africa are also, in most part, the creation of colonial
powers. Martin Meredith in his book, The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence,
succinctly describes Africa‘s territorial makeup as nation states or multinational entities as follows:
During the Scramble for Africa at the end of the nineteenth century, European powers staked
claims to virtually the entire continent. At meetings in Berlin, Paris, London and other
capitals, European statesmen and diplomats bargained over the separate spheres of interest
they intended to establish….The maps used to carve up the African continent were mostly
inaccurate; large areas were described as terra incognita. When marking out the boundaries
of their new territories, European negotiators frequently resorted to drawing straight lines on
the map, taking little or no account of the myriad of traditional monarchies, chiefdoms and
other African societies that existed on the ground. Nearly one half of the new frontiers
imposed on Africa were geometric lines, lines of latitude and longitude, other straight lines
or arcs of circles. In some cases, African societies were rent apart….In all the new boundaries
cut through some 190 culture groups. In other cases, Europe‘s new colonial territories
enclosed hundreds of diverse and independent groups, with no common history, culture,
language or religion. Nigeria, for example, contained as many as 250 ethno linguistic groups
(Meredith 2005, 1-2).
Then the question to the EMLs and their foreign collaborators is that what international law did
Ethiopia‘s Emperor Menilek break in expanding the country‘s territories to the south and south east?
Any objective narration and analysis of the history and politics of the region and that of Menilek‘s
136
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expansion should be discussed within contexts and perspectives, that is, the scramble for Africa and
the threat it posed to the sovereignty and independence of Ethiopia. It should take the colonial
ambition of Britain, France, and Italy in the region into consideration. Harold Marcus observed:
From 1896 to 1907, Menilek directed Ethiopia‘s return into southern and western regions
abandoned in the seventeenth century and into areas never before under his rule….The
European threat to the Ethiopian periphery worried Menilek enough to order Ras Makonnen
westward into Beni (or Bela) Shangu country. The imminence of British rule in Sudan gave
urgency to the acquisition of the gold producing area....Meanwhile, Menilek had ordered
forces to move into what were to become the empire‘s extreme peripheries, especially
Borena, directly in the path of British expansion northward from Kenya….Between 1896 and
1906, Ethiopia expanded to its present size, comprising the highlands, the key river systems,
and a borderland buffer zone in low-lying, arid, or tropical zones to protect the state‘s central
core (Marcus 1994, 104-105).
Historically, conquest and annexation were the norm upon which multinational states were created.
The founders of the Organization of African Unity, now the African Union, upon establishing their
organization in 1963 were cognizant of this complex and very intricate nature of the colonial
boundaries that created the African countries. They therefore agreed to include a provision in their
Charter that called for all nations to accept territorial boundaries drawn by the colonial powers.
It is reasonable to assume that Wallelign and all his EML comrades were fully aware of this
world and African historical facts. If this assumption is correct, then why could they not be critical
and consider the ramifications of imposing foreign ideology and paradigm to solve a problem they
created in their own minds? The principle of intellectual courage requires that researchers be
objective in their analysis. Unfortunately, this was not case with the EMLs. The paradigm they
prescribed for Ethiopia is intellectually lazy and hence indefensible. It lacked rigor and originality. It
encouraged mechanically transplanting a deceitful and disingenuous policy that has no relevance to
the Ethiopian situation. It is deceitful because it does mean what it says.
An objective assessment and analysis of Ethiopia‘s socio-political situation would have
shown that a large majority of Ethiopians were proud of to Ethiopians. A 1992 survey conducted
among 650 university and high school students from eight different regions of the country: Addis
Ababa, Bale, Gojjam, Gidole, Kembata, Arssi, Wolaita, and Gamu Gofa (Terfa 1993, 5-21), not only
illustrates this very vividly, but also contradicts Prime Minister Meles‘ contention that ethnic
federalism is ―the only solution to the century old oppression under centralist government and one
ethnic domination of culture, language, politics and economy‖ (Zenawi 2009, 6).
Eighty percent of the respondents consider themselves primarily Ethiopians and seventy five
percent of them clearly expressed their opposition to taking language as a criterion to delineating the
provinces of the federal state. In addition, sixty five percent of the respondents thought the absence
of democracy and the political domination of the country by authoritarian leaders were the premier
problems in Ethiopia rather than the national question as the drafters of the constitution asserted
(Terfa 1993, 13). The study also unmasks the erroneous claim of the leaders of the ethnically based
liberation movements that they represent the wishes of their people. Contrary to their belief, what is
at the heart of Ethiopia‘s problem is the absence of political freedom and democracy. The national
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question or the ―ethnic disharmony‖ is rather the creation of the EPRDF and thus alien to Ethiopian
politics. If at all, it was a hypothesis or a theoretical construct that had not been proven in the case of
Ethiopia. The leaders of the liberation movements decided that it was a national issue and thus took
up arms. However, it cannot be denied that there were culturally subjugated, politically oppressed
and economically exploited people in the history of the country.
Yet the people have lived together long enough to enable them to transcend their ethnic
consciousness and/or narrow nationalism and adopt Ethiopian way of life. Otherwise how would
one explain the fact that eighty percent of the survey respondents say they are Ethiopians first? In
addition, 80.9 percent of them said neither the government of Emperor Haile Sellasie nor that of
Colonel Mengistu was exclusively dominated by the Amhara ethnic group (Terfa 1993, 9). Eighty six
percent of them disagreed that the two governments were dominated by a coalition of Amhara-Tigre
ethnic groups (Terfa 1993, 10). Seventy four percent of the respondents agreed on the inclusive
nature of the two governments (Terfa 1993, 11).
The following two anecdotes clearly show the chasm between the ethnically based liberation
movement leaders and the people. The first one is about Mr. Wondimu Tchebero, a person of Dorze
ethnic background, one of the many ethnic groups that had been forcefully incorporated into the
―Ethiopian empire‖ by Menilek, who lamented over the government‘s policy that forced his children
to learn in their mother tongue, namely Dorzigna. Mr. Wondimu narrated his complaint to Mr.
Tesfaye Gebre Ab, who had once served in Prime Minister Meles‘ administration as Department
Head in the Ministry of Information. Mr. Wondimu began his complaint by criticizing the education
policy of the government that perpetrated a double standard. He regretted the fact that the children of
government officials, including that of the Prime Minister, are being taught in English while the
children of the downtrodden are being taught in their mother tongue. Did Meles not claim, Mr.
Wondimu recalled, that among his reasons for picking up arms and going to the bush was the fact
that he was forced by the previous governments to be taught in Amharic? Was this not the claim of
all of the current leaders? ―Now that they have the power, why are they not making their children the
beneficiaries of the fruit of their struggle?‖ he sarcastically asked (Gebre Ab 2009, 129).
As far as he is concerned, he wanted his children to be taught in Amharic so that they could
find a job. He does not want, he continued to say, his children to be condemned to be shemanewotch,
i.e., traditional weavers, a profession stereotypically and negatively associated with his ethnic group.
This daring and public declaration of Mr. Wondimu had made him popular, almost an icon, amongst
his people indicating the fact that his ethnic group does not share the claim of the former guerrillas
who now find themselves in power (Gebre Ab 2009, 128-131).
The second anecdote is about Mr. Ephrem Boru, an Oromo from Wallega, and a member of
another ―oppressed ethnic group.‖ Mr. Ephrem was a very prominent Oromo who had served the
government of Emperor Haile Selassie in various capacities in the 1960s. Among the position Boru
served include plenipotentiary Ambassador to Ghana early in the 1960s when President was still the
president of Ghana.
In the 1990s every Saturday my father used to pay a visit to his good friend to catch up and
socialize. On one particular Saturday in 1991, I had to give my father a ride the Ambassador‘s
138
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residence before I could borrow his car. When we arrived at the residence, the Ambassador invited
me in and I accepted the invitation thinking it would only be for a short while. That short while
turned out to be three hours, almost as much time as Nkrumah had spent explaining his dream to
him. At the outset, the Ambassador said to me that he had some important matter to share with me. It
was about his disappointment in some of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) leaders who had sent his
younger brother to invite him to attend their meetings. He expressed his disappointment on two
grounds. First, he said that ―he had lived all his life as an Ethiopian and now the OLF wanted him to
renounce this identity.‖ Second, he said ―it was his understanding that the OLF consider Amharic as
a colonial language.‖ Amharic then and still is government sanctioned national language.
The anguish on his face was visible when he continued to say ―I just could not reconcile this
with Nkrumah‘s dream of making Amharic the language of Africa.‖ Although he was stoically
fighting his tears, the lump in his throat betrayed him. His voice began to crack. He began to stutter
and stammer. I could also see the anguished pain in my father‘s face. It was a ―hell‖ of a scene for
me watching these two Oromo gentlemen in their 80s and late 70s respectively being tormented by
Oromo children who took the liberty to speak on behalf of all the Oromos. I sat there, for a while,
speechless and contemplating what I should say or do. Then I asked the Ambassador if would be
willing to come to the University of Addis Ababa, formerly Haile Selassie University, and share his
story with my students. I informed him that I was the chairman of the department of Political Science
and International Relations and that I could arrange for him to come and speak.
Unfortunately he said he could not come because of his heart problem. It then occurred to me
that he had a heart pacer implant. Then I asked him what he wanted me to do with the information,
he proceeded to tell me that ―he did not want to take it to his grave with him.‖ It was clear to me that
the Ambassador had wanted to keep his anecdote with President Nkrumah alive and be part of his
legacy. I will, therefore, take the liberty to paraphrase it as follows. It is to be remembered that
Nkrumah, a Pan-African in college, was one of the few and original advocates of African Unity.
After his effort to establish the United States of Africa was torpedoed by the Casa Blanca and
Monrovia groups, he settled for the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963 with
the help of, among others, Emperor Haile Selassie.
On the day the Ambassador presented his appointment credential to President Nkrumah, the
latter, taking almost three hours of his time, related to him his admiration of the Emperor, his
contribution to the establishment of the OAU, and most importantly the significance of Ethiopia‘s
independence from colonial rule. Ethiopia, he noted, had been the symbol of black pride in Africa in
particular and black people of the world in general. Nkrumah then told the Ambassador that Africa
would need one common language. English and French were out of the question for him for they are
colonial languages. Arabic was also out because did not think the Arabs consider themselves
Africans. And then he thought of Swahili as a possible language, but then remembered that it did not
have its own script.
Nkrumah, then enthusiastically, said that if the whole of Africa would begin teaching
Amharic then, in fifteen to twenty years, he projected Africa might be able to develop a language that
would help it fulfill its dream and establish the United States of Africa. Ambassador Boru told me
that he was overwhelmed and humbled by Nkrumah‘s dream. He said ―that was one of the giants of
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the Organization of African Unity.‖ The Ambassador then concluded his reminiscence by saying ―he
would never be able to reconcile Nkrumah‘s dream of wanting Amharic to be the language of Africa
and OLF‘s contention that Amharic is a colonial language.‖
I think it is a very opportune moment for me to share this with my readers. These two
anecdotes and the responses of the 650 students that were surveyed profoundly express the bottledup frustration of the people towards the so-called liberation front‘s and by extension to those who
have established the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia by superimposing it on a people
whose socio-economic and political evolution is much different from that of Czarist Russia. This is
why this writer argues that the ethno-linguistic federalism paradigm is fallacious.
Why the Constitution of the FDRE is a Hybrid of Marxism-Leninism and Liberal Democracy
To those who read with thought and purpose the hybrid nature of the constitution is evident. The
question then becomes why? The authors of the constitution are Marxist-Leninists. This is a given. It
is also a given fact that among their intentions is the ―liberation of oppressed nationalities‖ in the
country. So why is the Marxist-Leninist aspect of the constitution, the most pertinent aspect of the
document to the authors and power brokers, being intentionally subsumed within and/or
camouflaged by the overwhelming liberal-democratic aspect of the constitution? The simple truth is,
it is done to win the support of donor countries and institutions like the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and also the leaders of Western liberal democratic countries. No
wonder, therefore, that the World Bank wrote the following in its 1999 report. It read:
Ethiopia has embarked on a bold and thoughtful process of decentralization, which has been
supported by a widely shared consensus over both the development strategy and objectives
and very large transfers of united resources from the federal government to the regions. It
concluded by saying, ‗at this point the system is unquestionably working well‘ (Keller 2002,
33).
Keller pointing out the short comings or gullible nature of organizations like the World Bank, donor
institutions, and specialized agencies of the United Nations said:
By the standard of public administration, this would seem to be the case. However, there is a
political dimension that organizations like the World Bank and other international
development agencies seem to ignore or simply downplay. Ethnic federalism has not resulted
in a widespread consensus in the general population of Ethiopia (Keller 2002, 33).
To the authors of the Ethiopian constitution, adherence to Marxism-Leninism is not only a question
of practicality, but also of adherence, allegiance and loyalty. This is because the nuclei of the Tigray
People‘s Liberation Front were members of the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray, an exclusive club
dominated by Meles and his close friends. It is this group that dominated not only the Transitional
Government but also the constituent assembly that drafted the constitution. Aregawi Berhe, former
member of the leadership of the TPLF, succinctly put it this way:
In 1985 a party, officially known as the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) was
established within the TPLF, Meles Zenawi as its chief ideologue. In its constitution, this
party declared that…MLLT, as the core of the future Ethiopian Marxist Leninist Party, is the
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only correct party free from all sort of revisionism (Trotskyism, Maoism…) that could
constitute a proletarian-peasant dictatorship to liberate the Ethiopian people (Berhe 2009, 5).
In his April 3 and 5, 1990 interview with Paul B. Henze, Meles Zenawi tried to allay the fears of this
former American government official and through him the then American administration and the
Congress of the United States by saying the following:
We are not a Marxist-Leninist movement. We do not apply Marxism-Leninism in Tigray.
The name of our organization does not include any reference to Marxism –Leninism. We do
have Marxists in our movement. [I acknowledge that. I, myself, was a convinced Marxist
when I was a student at Haile Selassie Ist University] in the early 1970s and our movement
was inspired by Marxism]. But we have learned that dogmatic Marxism-Leninism is not
applicable in the field. We do not believe that any foreign system can be imposed on a
country (Henze 1990, 3; emphasis mine).
What else would he say on the eve of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of
Communism in Eastern Europe? He was fully aware that communism was being eclipsed by liberal
democracy and capitalism and that the balance of power was shifting in favor of the United States
and its allies. Hence, in order to obtain the uncritical support of the United States, the sole
superpower, and also its Western allies, Meles had to say exactly that. Henze, therefore, did not
hesitate to give Meles a piece of his mind. He noted: ―Because you have called yourselves Marxists
so often…. You yourself have been quoted as saying that you accept Albania as an ideal model for
the future Ethiopia. There have been numerous reports of praise of Stalin…but it has caused great
disquiet among serious people who are concerned about Ethiopia.‖
When Henze pressed him on his admiration of Albania, Meles had no compunction about
denying. He said…―We are not trying to apply an Albanian system. We are not trying to apply a
Soviet system or a Chinese system. We know the Albanians are also changing some features of their
system” (Henze 1990. ibid, emphasis mines).
Meles may want to deny but his pronouncement are on paper and, therefore, cannot be wished away.
What exactly did he say in 1989? His former friend in the TPLF Aregawi Berhe wrote:
In an interview with The Independent, at the end of 1989, the present Prime Minister of
Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, asserted that the ‗Soviet Union and other Eastern Europe bloc
countries have never been truly socialist. The nearest any country comes to being socialist as
far as we are concerned is Albania…To him, as was clearly maintained in the same
interview, only his party could lead to a fully democratic state. Aregawi continued
The officially published program and declarations of the MLLT and TPLF are no longer
visible since Zenawi joined the camp of the US....Eclectic as it appears, Zenawi’s policies
have drawn the whole country into a state of chaos and confusion, because of the
incompatibility between what he thinks and what he does (Berhe 2009, 5, emphasis mine).
It is therefore evident that Meles has tried to marry two diametrically opposed philosophies,
Marxism-Leninism and liberal democracy, in the constitution of the FDRE. It should be stated that
these two philosophies provide different approaches to solving problems between people and also
between the people and governments.
For liberal democracy, the right of the individual is paramount and, therefore, should not be
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subordinated to the right of a group or a collective. In a liberal democracy, the problem of the
individual or groups of individuals will be solved within the framework of democratic governance
where the rights, privileges, responsibilities and obligations of the individual are enshrined in the
constitution. If and when there is a discrepancy or inconsistencies or even contradictions between
what the constitution promises or offers and how the government of the time interprets the
constitution, designs and implements its policies to favor one person over another or one group of
people over the other, then the aggrieved person or groups of persons can address their grievances to
the courts.
In this connection, the dialectical development of the political history of the African
Americans in the United States is an eloquent testimony of how far they have come within the
framework of a liberal democracy. It is a vivid and painful memory that the Constitution of the
United States had once regarded them as slaves, and therefore property (Dye and Zeigler, 2009, 32)
then 3/5th of a human being before it granted them full citizenship (Thirteenth Amendment to the US
Constitution). I hasten to add that the passage of the various Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act
of the 1950s and 1960s, have contributed either to consolidating and/or expanding the gains that had
been made. It is also a historical fact that the founders of the constitution did not initially allow
suffrage to women (Nineteenth Amendment to the US Constitution) and property-less white men
(Dye and Zeigler 2009, 55). All these have been corrected and rectified by constitutional amendment
and/or taking it to the courts for their rulings.
How about the Civil War in the United States? Was it not a question of secession, one may
ask? The Civil War of 1860 was a lot different from this. The ten states that opted for secession and
took up arms were not willing to deal with the problem through legal or constitutional means. The
issue that led to their would-be secession was what to make of the western states. That was the bone
of contention between the northern states and the southern states. The southern states wanted the
western states to be their replica: cotton growers with slave culture, while the northern states
preferred them to be producers of raw materials and market for their products. These were two
diametrically opposed positions that could not be reconciled (Dye and Zeigler 2009, 56-57). The
position taken by President Abraham Lincoln, a man who was not known as an abolitionist was,
however, against its expansion to the western states. He said:
The whole nation is interested that the best use shall be made of these territories. We want
them for homes and free white people. This they cannot be, to any considerable extent, if
slavery shall be planted within them (ibid).
Hence, Lincoln‘s decision to go to war against the secessionist states was primarily to keep the
Union. It goes without saying that this is a responsibility that is bestowed upon the president by the
constitution. Marxism-Leninism, on the other hand, is a philosophy or an ideology that gives primacy
or precedence to groups or classes in Marxist parlance. The rights and demands of the individual
have to be subordinated to the interest of the class. Hence the division of society into classes. In the
slave society, the contradiction is between the slaves and the slave owners. In a feudal society, it is
between feudal lords and serfs. In the capitalist society, it is between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat or the working class. In a multinational empire, it is between the oppressor nation and the
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oppressed nations and/or nationalities. All these contradictions are resolved through class struggle
with the proletariat as the vanguard.
It is this approach to solving the problem of nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia that is
contained in Article 39 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It is to be remembered that
Meles had claimed that he was not a Marxist. He had also asserted that they do not apply MarxismLeninism in Tigray. So, where did Article 39 come from? The Article did not somehow, by some
inexplicable miracle or divine intervention, incorporate itself into the constitution and/or insist and
plead to be incorporated. It is in Lenin‘s thesis that one will find not only the application of the
concept of ―self-determination that includes secession‖ but also the delineation of boundaries
respecting national composition.
It was an open secret that Lenin regarded Czarist Russia as a ―prison house of nations.‖ As a
Marxist, he was convinced that the liberation of these nations and nationalities had to be tied and
linked to the struggle and liberation of the proletariat. Rob Sewell in his article entitled ―Lenin on the
National Question‖ observed:
Following on from Marx, Lenin took up the national question as a means of arming the
revolutionary social democracy in Russia and uniting the oppressed nationalities under the
banner of the working class. In answer to national oppression, the Russian Marxists…called
for the right of nations to self-determination, that is, to complete separation as states. This
was particularly relevant to tsarist Russia, whose empire constituted a ‗prison house of
nationalities.‘ Such was the make-up of the empire that the Great Russians, the ruling
nationality, only constituted 48% of the whole. Those under domination (Poles, Lithuanians,
Estonians, Finns, Letts, Ukrainians, and so on), deprived of their rights, were systematically
oppressed by tsarism. It was this that gave the national question in Russia such an explosive
force (Sewell 2004, 2).
This inevitably brought objections from Rosa Luxemburg, Bukharin and others who felt that
Lenin was abandoning and forgoing the natural alliance of the working class of the different
nationalities and advocating secession for its own sake. Lenin‘s advocacy for the right of the various
nationalities was, however, intended to weaken ―…bourgeois nationalism and winning the
confidence of the workers of the oppressed nation….‖ (ibid). Otherwise he had emphatically argued
that Marxists do not support every call for self-determination unless and until it is believed that it
will advance the struggle for socialism and the liberation of the proletariat. In his Collected Works,
Lenin declared:
However our unreserved recognition of the struggle for freedom of self-determination does
not in any way commits us to supporting every demand for national self-determination. As
the party of the proletariat, the Social-Democratic Party considers it to be its positive and
principal task to further the self-determination of the proletariat in each nationality rather
than that of peoples or nations. We must always and unreservedly work for the very closest
unity of the proletariat of all nationalities (Lenin 1903, 243-251).
Hence it is in the above quotation that one finds the answer to why Meles is waging a war against the
Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden Liberation Front, two organizations whose leaders had long
left the government of Prime Minister Meles‘ after accusing it of not being any different from the
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Haile Selassie‘s autocratic regime or from the Stalinist military junta of Colonel Mengistu, and
demanding that their people be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination as guaranteed to
them by Article 39 of the constitution.
Meles‘ idea of delineating the boundaries and apportioning territories to the various
nationalities is derived from Lenin‘s suggestion. Lenin said:
The proletariat cannot achieve freedom other than by revolutionary struggle for the
overthrow of the tsarist monarchy and its replacement by a democratic republic. The tsarist
monarchy precludes liberty and equal rights for nationalities… This monarchy can be
overthrown only by the united proletariat of all the nations of Russia….Social-Democrats
demand the abolition of the old administrative divisions of Russia established by the feudal
landowners and the civil servants of the autocratic feudal state and their replacement by
divisions based on the requirements of present-day economic life in accordance, as far as
possible, with the national composition of the population. All areas of the state that are
distinguished by social peculiarities or by the national composition of the population, must
enjoy wide self-government and autonomy, with institutions organized on the basis of
universal, equal and secret voting. Social-Democrats demand the promulgation of a law,
operative throughout the state, protecting the rights of every national minority in no matter
what part of the state. This law should declare inoperative any measure by means of which
the national majority might attempt to establish privileges for itself or restrict the rights of a
national minority (in the sphere of education, in the use of any specific language, in budget
affairs, etc.), and forbid the implementation if any such measure by making it a punishable
offense (Lenin 1977, 243-251; emphasis mine).
Meles, having created this political structure, believes that all of those who harbor secessionist
intentions need to be happy, settle down and embark on developing their ethnic fiefdom. He seems to
suggest that ―the prison house of nations‖ as Lenin used to refer to Czarist Russia, and Meles himself
uses it to amplify and describe Haile Selassie‘s and Mengistu‘s Ethiopia, has been destroyed. He
goes on to assume that the hitherto ―prisoners‖ have all been liberated and are allowed to live within
their geographically defined territories that has allowed them to establish their respective
government, develop their culture, speak, teach, learn, and conduct their courts in their respective
languages. Consistent with this, he would argue, is they have come together and established a federal
government that has given them equal voice in how it is run. Hence, he seems to conclude, they
should seize this moment and forge ahead.
The Domination of the Country by the TPLF
But the question then becomes, has Meles created the federal democratic republic that guarantees the
protection and advancement of all the rights and privileges of every nation and nationality? During
his interview with Paul B. Henze, in April 1990, Meles proclaimed:
The system the Derg has established must be destroyed or it will destroy the country. All the
resistance movements must come together and decide what the future of (the) country should be.
We propose a provisional government made up of all factions and parties and movements, right
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as well as left. Nobody should be left out. The provisional government should develop a plan for
a constituent assembly that will write a new constitution. The country will have to be federation
and there will have to be recognition of the right of every people in it to have autonomy. We can
no longer have Amhara domination….When we talk about Amhara domination, we mean the
Amhara of Shoa and the habit of Shoan supremacy that became established in Addis Ababa
during the last hundred years. This system has to change. The people who think they have a right
to dominate in Addis Ababa have to change their mentality. This is the mentality the Derg
adopted from the very beginning. No people of Ethiopia have the right to dominate any other
(Henze 1990, 5; emphasis mine).
Various scholars of the Ethiopian politics seem to agree that Ethiopia is a long way away from
Meles‘ declarations. In fact the hitherto elections and their result incontrovertibly show that Ethiopia
is and has been under the domination of a single ethnic group, the Tigreans who constitute only 6
percent of the population (Habtu 2003, 7) for the last eighteen years. Table1 below shows the 1995,
2000, and 2005 parliamentary election results and seat allocations to the EPRDF, where the TPLF‘s
number screams out for attention.
Table 1: Ethiopian Parliamentary Election Results 1995-2005
Party/Coalition
2005
2000
1995
Oromo People‘s Democratic 110
183
182
Organization (OPDO)
Amhara National Democratic 87
146
144
Movement (ANDM)
Southern Ethiopia People‘s 92
112
125
Democratic
Movement
(SEPDM)
Tigray People‘s Liberation 38
40
40
Front (TPLF)
Total
327/547*
481/547*
491/547*
Source: Ethiopian Parliament (2005).
* indicates, of the 547 total seats, EPRDF had ―won‖ 327, 481, and 491 seats for the years
shown above.
Browyn E. Bruton, International Affairs Fellow in Residence, in her article written on August 6,
2009, warns the Obama administration about possible catastrophic crisis that is brewing in the Horn
of Africa, particularly in Ethiopia. She urges President Obama‘s administration to seize the moment
and avert the impending crisis. Bruton also reminds the administration of the shrinking democratic
space and the domination of the political sphere in Ethiopia by the Tigrean minority that has
alienated the majority thereby aggravating the whole situation. She observed that ―….The
government‘s ruling party, the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), is
perceived by many Ethiopians to be dominated by a single minority ethnic faction, the Tigre, and its
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consolidation of political power may be read as an assault on the majority ethnic Amhara and Oromo
population‖ (Bruton 2009, 2-3).
Professor Marina Ottoway wrote:
In 1991 the TPLF had power based on its military superiority over the other movements. It
could not transform such power into political authority without dealing with the ethnic
problems. As a Tigrean nationalist movement, it had no support in other regions, nor could it
hope to gain it—Oromos and Amharas could never vote for a party dedicated to the cause of
Tigrean liberation. In the last period of the war against Mengistu, when the fighting started
spreading from Tigray to other regions, the TPLF took the first step to address the problem,
promoting the formation of ethnic movements in other regions and of an umbrella
organization, the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to bring
them together. But in 1991 these EPRDF-aligned parties were perceived as tools of the TPLF
and thus had little legitimacy (Ottaway 2009, 2).
In organizing the umbrella organization known as the EPRDF, the TPLF formed various satellite
parties to represent their respective national and regional groups: the EPDM (Ethiopian People's
Democratic Movement) represents the Amhara nationality; the OPDO (Oromo People's Democratic
Organization) represents the Oromo nationality; and the SEPDM (Southern Ethiopian People's
Democratic Movement) represents the peoples of the southern region of Ethiopia. It would not be
far from the truth to assert that these satellite parties could all be regarded as Trojan horses. They
were created by the TPLF to help it to mollify the peoples of their respective regions, to have access
to the natural resources of these same regions and to use them to achieve eventually the political
domination of the country. Hence I argue here that this could be the very reason why Meles and
company chose the parliamentary form of government with Prime Minister as head of the
government and a figurehead president as head of state and not the presidential form that could be
both the head of government and of state.
The burden of winning the premiership in the former form of government is, for the would be
prime minister, only to win his/her constituency and hope or help others in his/her party win theirs so
as to secure the majority seat in the parliament. The latter form of government, however, requires
that the would-be president compete in all the ethnic territories and win a clear majority. With the
presidential form of government no Tigrean could have won the presidency. It is a simple arithmetic.
The numbers are not there. Remember, this is an ethnic based federalism. An Oromo or an Amhara
or a coalition of Oromo-Amhara will dominate the political scene. The two ethnic groups constitute
better than ―62 per cent of the population‖ (Quoted in Alem Habtu 7). Meles would not allow this to
happen. He has unconsciously admitted his intention for the ethnically based federalism.
…this policy serves many interests including equitable distribution of wealth, empowerment of
ethnicities, and since this was how the nationalities were before colonization, as ethnicity was the
language they understood best. (He continued to say) ethnic basis of Ethiopia‘s democracy stemmed
from the government‘s fight against poverty and the need for an equitable distribution of the
nation’s wealth: peasants must be enabled to make their own decisions in terms of their own culture.
Power must be devolved to them in ways that they understand, and they understand ethnicity….Other
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approaches to development had been hegemonic and exploitative and had led to internecine strife
and civil war (Zenawi 2009, 6; emphasis mine).
There are two interesting issues in this declaration that are of significant importance. First,
Meles has not shown how the substitution of the exploitation of the various ethnic groups by the
Shoa Amharas, an ethnic group he despises with passion, by the Tigreans, to which he belongs, is
any different if not in form at least in substance? Or was it a Freudian slip that exposed the
undercurrent? Whatever the motivation, it has been communicated very eloquently but, sadly,
pungently.
The second issue is the absence of reasoned argument that explains what “equitable distribution
of resources” means in the context of federalism. Does it mean that Oromia with its large population
and significant amount of resources would share its resources equitably with the other regions?
Should not distribution of resources and /or revenues be contingent upon population and other
criteria that should not disadvantage the territories that have large population and territory to
develop? As a unique form of federalism, it is incumbent upon the government to explain what it
means.
Professor Keller who had done an in-depth study of how the federal government in Ethiopia is
managing its affairs differently from other federal countries seems to suggest that federalism in
Ethiopia‘s case is a misnomer. He said:
Also, like central governments in all federal states, it is responsible for the conduct of foreign
policy, insuring national defense, monetary policy, and setting policy relating to inter-regional
state transportation and commerce. In spite of the fact that the Constitution gives a great deal of
power and administrative authority to regional states, the overwhelming amount of political
power in this system rests with the central government. Because of this, in practice, Ethiopia
operates more like a unitary state, with regional states closely following the policy lead of the
center, mainly as represented in the TPLF’s Five year Program rather than asserting their
policy independence ( Keller 2002, 34, emphasis mine).
Theodore Vestal, a very distinguished scholar describing Oromo People‘s Democratic Organization
and the other appendages observed:
In every regional government, a shadow party organization operated as a disciplined phalanx to
carry out the will of the EPRDF leadership….Important decisions are made by party leaders
behind closed doors. Not a single important political or organizational question is decided by
government officials or mass organizations without guiding direction from the party. The Front
(TPLF) stands above all, and the leaders do not test their policies in a forum of free speech and
fair elections. Instead they mobilize and enforce consent (Vestal 2009, quoted in the US Bureau
of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 4-5).
Another scholar, Dr. Seyoum Hameso, after having critically assessed the situation, contended that
even though the TPLF promised and championed collective rights, the use of one‘s language, the
decentralization of power and the provision of regional autonomy, the promise and hope was short
lived as the TPLF wanted to entrench itself as an Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Front (Hameso
2001, 1). Dr. Berhanu G. Balcha, on writing about the shortcoming of the Meles regime, seems to
suggest that because the TPLF represents a minority ethnic group in the Ethiopian polity, it would
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not of necessity establish a democratic federal government. To do so, he seems to argue, would be
tantamount to committing suicide. He said that the TPLF is aware that Tigreans constitute only 6
percent of the Ethiopian people as compared to the Oromos and Amhars who constitute 35 percent
and 30 percent respectively (Balcha 2009, 3). Balcha continued to argue that this reality has
compelled the TPLF to devise another route.
Instead of establishing genuine ethnic federal arrangement and genuine ethnic coalition
government, it has opted to join forces with sycophants that have no legitimacy in their ethnic
communities and establish its hegemony (Balcha 2009, 3). In order to guarantee the domination of
Ethiopia by the TPLF, a front of a minority ethnic group, it appears that Meles has devised a unique
form of government machinery. It is a government that appeals and entices the intellectuals of
various ethnic groups who have no qualm of not only accepting to play a secondary role but also to
permanently relegating the rights, privileges and aspirations of ―their people‖ to a secondary and
possibly tertiary importance.
The statute of the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front approved by the Sixth
Congress of the EPRDF declares that ―EPRDF is a Front founded by the union of revolutionary
democratic organizations. It is not a Front (that is) organized by recruiting individuals‖ (Ethiopian
People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front Statute, Art. 7, Sect.1a). The Statute in its introduction
declares the importance of establishing multi-national organization as follows: Since Ethiopia is a
multi-national country, the way to guide its different nationalities and peoples together for the
struggle should be through a Front made up of multi-national member organizations, and not in an
organizational framework of individuals. Because the Front consisting of multi-national
organizations will fulfill two basic questions:
a. Ethiopian nations and nationalities by forming an organization based upon nations and
nationalities of their own are practically showing the will their rights and benefits be
protected in a fundamental way. The current situation indicates that nations and
nationalities could secure a better organizational leadership and political participation
when they are in struggle under the leadership of nations and nationality organizations of
their own. As thus each nationality, under a respective national organization will improve the
condition for the respect of their rights and benefits. EPRDF, being an organization of
nations and nationalities and dedicated to the respect of rights and values of Ethiopian
nations and nationalities, should embrace organizations that are formed on the basis of
nations and nationalities to protect the rights and benefits of nations and nationalities.
b. National organizations are organizations that are formed in order to protect the rights and
benefits of their nations and nationalities under the revolutionary democratic program.
Keeping this in mind, the formation of organizations of nations and nationalities that are
governed by the democratic objectives which foster fraternity and unity among different
organizations is fundamental. The formation of nations and nationality organizations under
one revolutionary democratic Front will be the better choice to realize this objective. So, as
EPRDF is an organization which stands to secure equality and unity among the peoples of
Ethiopia, it realizes the objective by embracing member organizations that are dedicated to
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protect the rights and also gain support from their people easily (ibid, Sections 2a and b,
emphasis mine).
One may ask what EPRDF‘s assumption was when it authored its statute? What have these
authors taken for granted? The assumption is, it is obvious, that EPRDF is the sole representative of
all of the nations and peoples of Ethiopia. They have also taken for granted that EPRDF‘s power
cannot be curtailed or questioned by any governmental body or organ including the High Court of the
country. Consciously and/or unconsciously the authors have also assumed that the statute could
trample not only the constitution of the country but also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
with impunity. However, according to international law, if a country is a party to an international
law, treaty or agreement, which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is, then, the government
that is a signatory party to the law has the obligation to make sure that all the provisions in its
constitution pertaining to human rights should be consistent with or be complementary to the former.
If and when there is any contradiction or inconsistency between the two, then the government is
required to amend its laws accordingly.
Now then, it is clear that the statute of the EPRDF does not only negate Article 31 of its own
constitution, the provision that guarantees the right of everyone to form an association for whatever
purpose, but also Article 21 sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Section 1 guarantees everyone
…the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives, section two guarantees everyone the right to equal access to public service in his
country, and section three declares the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedures (Carter and Trimble 1991, 877-878).
Now the question is, if the government, in this case EPRDF, circumscribes and limits the right of the
Ethiopian people, through proclamation, how then will they exercise their ―free choice,‖ have ―equal
access to public service in their country‖ and express their will periodically in a genuine election, as
demanded by sections 1, 2, and 3 of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? It is
evident that the government has infringed upon their right by restricting them to vote to
organizations they had no say in their creation. How could this system of voting be regarded as free
and democratic and be the basis upon which the authority and legitimacy of the government rests?
Simply put, because the government has taken the liberty and the power to dictate to the people, it
has robbed them of their sovereign right and power to be the foundation of democratic governance.
The statute is also in contradiction with Article 25 section ―A‖ of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights that encourages everyone ―to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.‖ Here again, the same problem comes to light. There cannot
be free choice as long as the government circumscribes how the people are to be organized and ipso
facto negate their right to free choice. The statute, the working and guiding principle of the EPRDF,
has given the government the power to promulgate all laws and policies that protect and advance its
narrow interests. No wonder why the Parliament adopted a very controversial decree that robbed
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nongovernmental organizations, including political organizations, the right to receive financial
assistance or contributions from foreign sources.
By emphatically and categorically stating that ―…it is not the job of NGOs to protect the rights of
citizens,‖ the government is unabashedly saying its power over its people has no bound. Peter
Heinlein of the Voice of America observed that the Ethiopian Parliament approved a law on January
6, 2009, that criminalizes many NGO activities. He wrote:
Ethiopia‘s parliament has overwhelmingly approved a law that will sharply restrict the activities
of most civil society groups. The law has been the target of scathing criticism from opposition
parties, rights groups and many foreign governments, including the United States. The ruling
Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Party used its massive parliamentary majority to
push through a law that gives the government broad powers over foreign funded
nongovernmental organizations. The so-called Charities and Societies Proclamation prohibits
any group receiving at least 10 percent of its funds from abroad from promoting democratic or
human rights, the rights of children, or equality of gender or religion. Violators could face stiff
fines and sentences of up to 15 years in prison (Heinlein 2009, 1-2).
Among the NGOs that are targeted by this law is the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). Its declared function is to:
...strengthen the capacity and role of civil society, improve independent human rights monitoring,
investigation, and reporting, and work to improve the respect the judiciary and police have for
international, national, and institutional human rights regulations…also strengthen the federal
and regional parliaments operating in the new, multiparty environment, and build the capacity of
national and regional judicial training centers and select law schools (USAID Sub-Saharan
Africa: Ethiopia 2009, 2).
As it has been noted above, the ―constitution‖ has all the rights, including the bill of rights and is
supposed to protect and guard against governmental excesses and violation rights. The record of the
FDRE regarding the violation of human rights is well-documented. Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, and all other advocates of human rights have incessantly produced evidence to this
effect.
Authoritarianism of the TPLF/EPRDF
How does Ethiopia fare in its peacefulness and protection of human rights among the community of
nations? This is no longer left to an individual subjective evaluation or whims. The Global Peace
Index has tried to scientifically and objectively measure not only nations‘ relative peacefulness but
also their adherence to the protection of human rights by critically examining and assessing issues
that are pertinent to the topic. In this connection, Global Peace Index ranks Ethiopia 121st out of 144
countries for the year 2009; and 121st out of 140 countries for the year of 2008; and 103rd out of 121
countries for the year of 2007 (Global Peace Index 2009, 5). As Table 2 below indicates, amongst
the many indicators GPI used, I have taken the liberty to select the most pertinent ones for this
purpose. Is there any wonder, therefore, that Prime Minister Meles is ranked seventeenth amongst
world‘s worst dictators? (Parade 2007, 1).
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Table 2: The Global Peace Index
(Peace Index scores from 1 to 5 where 1= most peaceful)
Indicators
2009
2008
Political Instability
3.5
3.25
Respect for Human Rights
4
3
Political Participation
5
5
Civil Liberties
4.41
4.4
Political Democracy Index
4.52
4.5
Likelihood of Violent Demonstration
4
4
Electoral Process
3
3
Functioning of Government
3.93
3.9
Level of Organized Conflict Internal
3.5
3.5
Relations with neighboring countries
3
3
Source: Global Peace Index, 2009. 1-2.

2007
3.25
4
5
4.4
4.7
4
4
3.9
3.5

Due to the fact that 85 percent of Ethiopia‘s population is rural whose livelihood is based on
subsistence farming, their ability to contribute financial assistance and/or pay monthly dues to a
political party of their choice is very limited if not impossible. The relatively small percent of the
middle class not only has been eroded and reduced through forced and/or voluntary exile, but also
has been impoverished due to inflation, unemployment and under-employment. Hence it cannot be a
reliable source of financial contributions.
This, therefore, means that the organizations will be, ipso facto, dependent on Ethiopian
Diasporas for their financial support. It goes without saying therefore that, to criminalize financial
assistance or contributions from foreign sources, as the Parliament has done, and eloquently
discussed by Peter Heinlein of the Voice America above, is, in the opinion of many, tantamount to
condemning the country to one party domination and dictatorship. It is obvious that this will only
serve the interest of the government whose party has not only had absolute control of the country, but
also the unique opportunity of safeguarding the treasury of the same.
As argued above, the EPRDF statute contradicts Article 25 section ―A‖ of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights that guarantees the rights of individuals or groups of individuals to
establish an organization of their choosing. By so doing, it, in-effect, restricts their right to vote for
an organization composed of groups of individuals that are motivated by common ideals, goals,
aspirations, dreams and visions for their country. In other words, groups and individuals that want to
transcend narrow nationalism or parochialism and establish organizations based on other metrics or
priorities will not be able to do so.
It is possible to postulate that if and when organizations are ethnically based and are represented
in parliament accordingly; their working relationship would be one of competition. The fact that they
have been forced to organize themselves ethnically means that there will be suspicion and mistrust
amongst them. The ethnic groups that constitute the absolute majority in the parliament, in this case
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the elements that constitute the EPRDF will not have the incentive or the desire to want to cooperate
and work with the other ethnically organized parties. This is exactly what is happening in the EPRDF
dominated parliament in Ethiopia. The relationship that obtains between the various ethnic groups in
the parliament is antagonistic. This modus operandi will contribute to undermining Ethiopians,
thereby weakening national consciousness. TPLF dominated EPRDF has not created a government
that ended ethnic domination as Meles had pledged to Paul Henze.
Conclusion
As this study shows, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was born out of mistrust and
suspicion between the people and the TPLF led government. Although the TPLF/EPRDF has tried to
get legitimacy for its constitution, it has not materialized as of yet. The course of action that is
needed is for the TPLF to make serious assessment and soul searching. The leadership needs to
summon its genuine courage and consider earnestly the extent to which its biases, prejudices, and
worldview have played a role in its decision to superimpose an ethno-linguistic federal paradigm on
the Ethiopian people.
It has always been the contention of the TPLF, according to Berhe, that the effort of the
Tigrean people to form its national state has been frustrated by the dominant Amhara nation (Berhe,
1981, 4). By holding the ―Amhara nation,‖ primarily the Shoan Amhara, as the culprit for the
oppression of all ―nations and nationalities‖ in the ―empire,‖ the TPLF has embarked on a systematic
destruction of the national consciousness, sowing the seed of discord amongst people who have lived
for centuries in relative harmony intermingling and intermarrying between and across ethnic lines.
Meles needs to be true to his own constitution and empower the Ethiopian people by vesting
them with their inalienable right to sovereignty. This demand is both legitimate and democratic. The
call for this demand transcends nationality and/or ethnicity. All peace loving and democratic forces
can rally around this call. The May 2005 election and its aftermath had exposed the brute, callous,
and authoritarian nature of the TPLF regime. The TPLF cannot claim to have established the
―Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia when, in fact, it is neither democratic nor republic in
substance.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in its Human Development Report 2002,
under the subheading ―Deepening democracy in a Fragmented world‖ contend that the central
challenges for deepening democracy is building the key institutions of democratic governance. They
include:
 the existence of a well functioning political parties and interest associations,
 a system of checks and balances based on the separation of powers with independent
judicial and legislative branches,
 a vibrant civil society able to monitor government and private business,
 a free and independent media, and
 effective civilian control over the military and other security forces
(UNDP 2002, 4).
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The above prerequisites are either non-existent or are under very close supervision and
surveillance by the FDRE. The authoritarian nature of the TPLF/EPRDF has been discussed earlier
in this analysis. Human Rights Watch in 2009, under the heading ―Ethiopia: Events of 2009”
contend that the Meles‘ government has continued to shrink the space within which the independent
civil society was operating thereby affecting its activities. This measure, according to HRW, has
made it the most restrictive of any comparable law anywhere in the world. Continuing with its
censorship of the government, Human Rights Watch said that the new media law it passed in 2008
not only restricts the space but also constrains the activities of journalists. It also lampoons the
government for continuing the lengthy periods of pretrial and pre-charge detention to punish critics
and opposition activists and also for torturing and abusing the same (Human Rights Watch 2009, 12). It is therefore evident that TPLF/EPRDF is far away from being democratic. Unless and until aid
donors make their development assistance to Ethiopia contingent on the building of the key
institutions of democratic governance, the Millennium Development Goals, as will be discussed
below, will not be met by the FDRE. Tom Porteous the Human Rights Watch, in his article under the
heading Ethiopia: the Aid-Politics Trap wrote:
Ethiopia is the largest recipient of western development assistance in Africa. In 2005-08, aid to
Ethiopia more than doubled-from $1.9 billion to $3.4 billion. Yet the country‘s domestic politics
are becoming less democratic and more repressive. Could there be a link between aid and
repression? … Ethiopia is a de facto one-party state masquerading as a democracy. Its ruling
party, the Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), permeates the state and
goes to great lengths to ensure citizens‘ political loyalty. In parliamentary elections in May 2010,
the EPRDF won 99.6% of the seats. In local elections in 2008 it won more than 99% ….Now,
HRW‘s research indicates that the coercive mechanisms by which the EPRDF maintains control
of the country have come to include the politicization and manipulation of aid. The report
documents numerous instances of government officials distributing and withholding the benefits
of donor-funded programmes-such as fertilizers, agricultural seeds, food, microcredit, and job
and training opportunities-on the basis of party affiliation (Porteous 2010, 1-2).
With all the political problems that have been bedeviling the country for the last eighteen years, it
would be extremely difficult for the government of Prime Minister Meles to be able to discharge its
obligations and responsibilities as outlined by the heads of state and government of members of the
United Nations in their Millennium Development Goals in 2000 (UNDP 2002, 17). The International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in their Plan for the 2009-2010 have the
following to say about the dire situation that faces Ethiopia.
Currently ranking 169 out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index, Ethiopia is
facing complex challenges ranging from a huge population growth (resulting in a very young
population with 44 percent being under 15 years) high illiteracy rates, and tremendous health
challenges with malaria, meningitis, and HIV and AIDS being the major killers. Access to clean
water and sanitation facilities are severely limited, with 78 percent of the total population not having
access to safe drinking water. In addition, Ethiopia is among the most disaster prone countries in
Sub- Saharan Africa regularly affected by severe drought, floods, as well as political unrests and
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tribal conflicts.
Due to a high population density and the repeated exposure to natural disasters, Ethiopia
chronically suffers from food insecurity. Environmental degradation and sever effects of climate
change make food security one of the main priorities for humanitarian assistance in the country
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, Plan 2009-2010, Ethiopia, 1).
Mark Malloch Brown, the administrator of the UNDP, on writing the forward to the Human
Development Report, stresses the importance of political empowerment of the people to economic
development. In his words:
This Human Development Report is first and foremost about the idea that politics is as important
to successful development as economics. Sustained poverty reduction requires equitable
growth—but it also requires that poor people have political power. And the best way to achieve
that in a manner consistent with human development objectives is by building strong and deep
forms of democratic governance at all levels of society (Human Development Report 2002
UNDP, V).
What any serious statesman and astute student of politics can learn from peoples uprisings in
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and possibly Syria is that no matter how long the peoples‘ yearning for
liberty, respect, and dignity are suppressed, the time will come when the internal conditions and the
external environment will allow them to decide the measure they need to take. What were considered
as suppression were in fact smoldering until the time was ripe for a small provocation to ignite them
into a burning flame. In this connection, the dreams and aspirations of the Ethiopian people are not
any different from the people of the countries referenced earlier. But will they take the same route?
That is for the future to determine.
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